1 Stephen Matthews Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon, PLLC 900 Paulsen Center W. 421 Riverside 3 Spokane, Washington 99201 (509) 838-6055 4 James Plunkett Milton Chappell c/o National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. 5 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600 6 Springfield, Virginia 22160 (800) 336-3600 (Pro Hac Vice motion pending) 7 8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 11 Andre Opsal, Liz Flugel, Debbie Koepp, Kimberly 12 JOHNSON, DARREL MOLLENHOUR, JOANNE RICE, STEPHEN SERGI, JAMES SZPEK, MAXINE DUNKELMAN and PATRICIA **13** WOODWARD 14 Plaintiffs, 15 v. 16 WASHINGTON FEDERATION OF STATE EMPLOYEES, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 17 MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL, AFL-CIO, an unincorporated association; STEVE MCLAIN, Director, 18 Washington State Labor Relations Office; GARY WEEKS, Civil Director, Washington State Department of Labor and No. 19 Industries; DAVE STEWART, Assistant Director for Office of Human Resources, Washington State Department of Labor **PLAINTIFF** 20 and Industries; ROBIN ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, Secretary, OPSAL, et al.'s Washington State Department of Social and Health CLASS 21 Services; BETTY RAMAGE, Director of Human Resources, **ACTION** Washington State Department of Social and Health **COMPLAINT** 22 Services; LIZ LUCE, Director, Washington State Department of Licensing; ALAN HAIGHT, Assistant Director for Administrative Services, Washington State Department of 23 Licensing; MARY C. SELECKY, Secretary, Washington State 24 Department of Health; JANICE ADAIR, Assistant Secretary, Washington State Department of Health 25 Defendants, 26 MICHAEL J. MURPHY, Treasurer, State of Washington 27 Rule 19(a) Defendant 28

	'n	1/1	DT	٨	IN	Т
•	1		м	. 🕰		

Plaintiffs Andre Opsal, Liz Flugel, Debbie Koepp, Kimberly Johnson,

1	
-	
1	

3

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Darrel Mollenhour, Joanne Rice, Stephen Sergi, James Szpek, Maxine Dunkelman and Pat Woodward (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs"), complain of the acts and omissions done by the Washington Federation of State Employees, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (hereinafter referred to as "WFSE"), as well as the acts done by Steve McLain, Director, Washington State Labor Relations Office; Gary Weeks, Director, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries; Dave Stewart, Assistant Director for the Office of Human Resources of the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries; Robin Arnold-Williams, Secretary, Washington Department of Social and Health Services; Betty Ramage, Director of Human Resources, Washington Department of Social and Health Services; Liz Luce, Director, Washington State Department of Licensing; Alan Haight, Assistant Director for Administrative Services, Washington State Department of Licensing; and Janice Adair, Assistant Secretary, Washington State Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as "Employer Defendants") (Washington State Treasurer Michael J. Murphy is named

NATURE OF THE CASE

as a Rule 19(a) Defendant in order for complete relief to be accorded), and allege:

2. This is a civil rights class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking equitable relief, including reinstatement with back pay and full benefits, declaratory relief, nominal and compensatory damages and/or restitution and other relief to prevent and/or redress the deprivation under color of Washington law of Plaintiffs' rights, privileges and immunities under the United States Constitution.

3. Upon instructions from Defendant WFSE and, on information and belief, Steve McLain, Director of the Washington State Labor Relations Office, Alan

- Haight, the Assistant Director of Administrative Services of the Washington State
 Department of Licensing, notified Plaintiff Woodward via letter dated December 9,
- 3 \ 2005, of her termination from employment with the Department of Licensing
- 4 | effective December 9, 2005, for failure to comply with the compulsory unionism
- 5 | clause in the collective bargaining agreement between WFSE and the State of
- 6 Washington ("CBA"). This termination was effectuated in a manner that violated
- 7 | Plaintiff Woodward's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth by the
- 8 United States Supreme Court in *Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292
- 9 (1986). It is therefore necessary for this Court to order her immediate
- 10 reinstatement with full back pay and benefits, as well as immediate injunctive
- 11 relief, along with nominal and compensatory damages in order to address the
- 12 | violations of Plaintiff Woodward's constitutional rights.
- 13 | 4. Upon instructions from Defendant WFSE and, on information and belief,
- 14 | Steve McLain, Director of the Washington State Labor Relations Office, Janice
- 15 Adair, the Assistant Secretary of the Washington State Department of Health,
- 16 notified Plaintiff Dunkelman via letter dated December 19, 2005, of her
- 17 | termination from employment with the Department of Health effective January 3,
- 18 2006, for failure to comply with the compulsory unionism clause in the CBA. This
- 19 termination was effectuated in a manner that violated Plaintiff Dunkelman's First
- 20 and Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth by the United States Supreme Court
- 21 | in *Hudson*. It is therefore necessary for this Court to order her immediate
- 22 reinstatement with full back pay and benefits, as well as immediate injunctive
- 23 relief, along with nominal and compensatory damages in order to address the
- 24 violations of Plaintiff Dunkelman's constitutional rights.
- 25 | 5. Furthermore, Defendant WFSE and Rule 19(a) Defendant Murphy have
- 26 demanded and/or remitted and accepted compulsory fees from the wages of
- 27 | Plaintiff Opsal on or around July 15, 2005, from Plaintiff Flugel on or around
- 28 August 25, 2005, and from Plaintiff Szpek on or around February 10, 2006, as well

as from the wages of members of the class Plaintiffs seek to represent, in a manner that violates Plaintiffs' and class members' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in *Hudson*. It is therefore necessary for this Court to order immediate injunctive relief, along with nominal and compensatory damages, in order to address WFSE's continuing violations of Plaintiffs' and class members' constitutional rights by deducting compulsory fees in the absence of full *Hudson* compliance, and include Rule 19(a) Defendant Murphy for full injunctive relief.

- 6. Plaintiff Rice has filed a timely request for "non-association" based on bona fide religious tenets after receiving notice of this option from WFSE, despite the fact that WFSE has never provided Plaintiffs or class members with the procedural safeguards that are constitutionally required under *Hudson*. Because the WFSE has not granted this request for "non-association," Plaintiff Rice and other class members who filed similar requests are in imminent danger of having their employment terminated. It is therefore necessary for this Court to order immediate injunctive relief in order to prevent Defendant WFSE from seeking the termination of said Plaintiff and other members of the class.
- 7. Since on or about November 2005, Defendant WFSE and the Employer Defendants have threatened to terminate Plaintiffs Koepp, Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and Szpek, and other class members that they seek to represent, for failure to pay fees to the WFSE, despite the fact that WFSE has never provided Plaintiffs or class members with the procedural safeguards that are constitutionally required under *Hudson*. Although WFSE has since rescinded these requests, except in regards to Plaintiff Johnson, termination threats against Plaintiffs Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and Szpek have not been rescinded by their employer, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. It is therefore necessary for this Court to order immediate injunctive relief in order to prevent the terminations of Plaintiffs Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and other members of the class.

1	Additionally, along with all Plaintiffs and class members, Plaintiff Koepp seeks				
2	nominal damages for the violation of her constitutional rights.				
3					
4	JURISDICTION				
5	8. Plaintiffs' claims arise under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the				
6	United States Constitution. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28				
7	U.S.C. 1331.				
8	9. This claim also arises under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.				
9	§ 1983, to redress the deprivation, under color of State law, of rights, privileges				
10	and immunities secured to Plaintiffs by the United States Constitution.				
11	Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C.				
12	§1343, pursuant to which the Court may grant: a) reinstatement with full back pay				
13	and benefits; b) damages or restitution for fees seized in violation of Plaintiffs'				
14	First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; c) injunctive relief against the future				
15	unlawful enforcement of the compulsory unionism clause of the collective				
16	bargaining agreement by any means including, but not limited to, the collection of				
17	said fees, the threats to terminate or actual termination of the nonmembers'				
18	employment for failure to pay fees; d) nominal damages for the violation of				
19	Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and e) reasonable attorneys'				
20	fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.				
21	10. This is also a case of actual controversy where Plaintiffs are seeking a				
22	declaration of their rights under the Constitution of the United States. Under 28				
23	U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, this Court may declare the rights of Plaintiffs and the				
24	requested class and grant further necessary and proper relief based thereon,				
25	including preliminary and injunctive relief, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil				
26	Procedure 65.				
27					

VENUE

11. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391(b) and (c) because Defendants either reside and/or have offices and conduct their business in this judicial district, and because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in this judicial district.

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1

3

4

PARTIES

12. The Plaintiffs are Washington State employees and are all employed – except for Plaintiffs Woodward and Dunkelman, who were terminated for failing to comply with the compulsory unionism clause, even in the absence of full *Hudson* compliance - in bargaining units which are represented for the purposes of collective bargaining, by WFSE. Plaintiffs Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and Szpek are employed by the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries. Plaintiffs Opsal, Flugel and Koepp are employed by the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services. Plaintiff Rice is employed by the Washington State Employment Security Department. Plaintiff Woodward was employed by the Washington State Department of Licensing. Plaintiff Dunkelman was employed by the Washington State Department of Health. As such, Plaintiffs

- are "employees" within the meaning of RCW § 41.80.005. Plaintiffs are not members of WFSE.
- 20 13. Defendant WFSE is an "employee organization" as defined by RCW §
- 21 | 41.80.005, and has been recognized as the monopoly bargaining representative for
- 22 Washington State employees in at least 33 different bargaining units throughout
- 23 the State. The WFSE conducts its business and operations throughout the State of
- 24 Washington, and is affiliated with various locals throughout the State, as well as
- 25 | the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).
- **26** Defendant WFSE is headquartered in Olympia, Washington.
- 27 | 14. As the Governor's designee under RCW § 41.80.010, Employer Defendant
- 28 Steve McLain, Director of the Washington State Labor Relations Office, managed

1 the collective bargaining process that resulted in the adoption of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the State of Washington and the WFSE. On information and belief, as Director of the Labor Relations Office, Mr. McLain 3 has the power to enforce, and has enforced, the CBA, including the compulsory 5 unionism clause in the agreement. Also, in his capacity as director of the Labor 6 Relations Office, Mr. McLain has the power to request the termination of State employees for noncompliance with the terms of the CBA, as well as the power to 7 rescind these requests. He is sued in his official capacity. 15. Employer Defendants Gary Weeks, Robin Arnold-Williams, Liz Luce and Mary Selecky are "Managers," as defined in RCW § 41.06.022, of the Washington **10** 11 State Department of Labor and Industries, the Washington State Department of 12 Social and Health Services, the Washington State Department of Licensing, and the Washington State Department of Health, respectively. As such, they have **13** 14 substantial authority that is not merely routine or clerical in nature with regard to **15** personnel administration and have the power to hire and terminate employees, as 16 well as the power to rescind such orders. They are sued in their official capacities. **17** Employer Defendants Dave Stewart and Betty Ramage are in charge of the **18** Human Resources divisions at the Washington State Department of Labor and 19

well as the power to rescind such orders. They are sued in their official capacities.

16. Employer Defendants Dave Stewart and Betty Ramage are in charge of the Human Resources divisions at the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries and the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, respectively. Employer Defendant Alan Haight is in charge of the Administrative Services Division at the Washington State Department of Licensing. Employer Defendant Janice Adair is the Assistant Secretary at the Washington State Department of Health. As such, Stewart, Ramage, Haight and Adair have substantial authority and power to hire and terminate employees, as well as the power to rescind such orders. They are sued in their official capacities.

17. Defendant Michael J. Murphy (hereinafter "Murphy"), named herein as a Rule 19(a) defendant, is the Treasurer of the State of Washington. As such, he is charged with the responsibility of issuing wages to employees of the State and/or

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

its Departments, including Plaintiffs and other members of the requested class, and processing all deductions therefore, including for so-called "representation fees" pursuant to compulsory unionism agreements, as authorized by RCW § 41.80.100.

He is sued in his official capacity. Defendant Murphy is named as a party pursuant to Rule 19(a), FED.R.CIV.P., because, in his absence, complete injunctive relief concerning the deduction of the compulsory fees cannot be accorded among those already named as defendants.

8

10

11

12

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 18. This is a class action brought by Plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3). The class that
- 13 Plaintiffs seek to represent consists of all State employees, who at the time since
- 14 | July 1, 2005, work in bargaining units which were, are, have been, or will be
- 15 represented exclusively for purposes of collective bargaining by WFSE, and were,
- 16 are, and/or will nevertheless be required to pay nonmember "agency shop" fees to
- 17 WFSE as a mandatory condition of employment.
- 18 | 19. The number of persons in this class is believed to number in the thousands.
- 19 Since these persons are so numerous, joinder of all class members is therefore
- 20 impractical.
- 21 20. There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class, to
- 22 wit, whether Defendants have remitted and seized fees from nonmembers, and/or
- 23 threatened to terminate or actually have terminated nonmembers, or otherwise
- 24 taken "adverse action" against nonmembers, prior to providing them with all of the
- 25 | notice and procedural safeguards required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
- 26 of the United States Constitution as prerequisites to the seizure of compulsory
- 27 agency fees from the wages of nonmember State employees.
- 28 21. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of other members of the class who are subject

- to the same deprivations of their rights by Defendants' enforcement of the compulsory unionism clause of the collective bargaining agreement including, but not limited to, "adverse action" taken against nonmembers, which includes threats to terminate or actual termination of their employment, as well as the seizure of compulsory fees in the absence of the constitutionally-required notice and procedural safeguards, as hereinafter alleged.
- 7 | 22. The named Plaintiffs can adequately represent the interests of the class.

interpreted by the Supreme Court in *Hudson*, 475 U.S. at 306.

- Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to the other members of the class related to
 the subject matter of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs and other members of the class are
 entitled to notice and the procedures and safeguards required by the Constitution as
- 12 23. Plaintiffs' attorneys are provided by a national charitable legal aid
 13 organization and are experienced in representing employees in litigation, including
 14 class actions, involving issues identical or similar to those raised in this action.
- 15 | Plaintiffs' attorneys are well-qualified to be appointed class counsel by the Court.
 - 24. Because the Defendants' duty under *Hudson* to provide notice and procedural protections adequate to protect the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of nonunion employees applies equally to all class members, the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.
 - 25. Defendants have acted and threaten to continue to act on grounds generally applicable to all, thereby making appropriate declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief with regard to the class as a whole.
 - 26. The questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, because the individual class members are deprived of the same rights

11

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

by Defendants' actions and threatened actions, and differ only in non-material aspects of their factual situation.

3

1

2

4 | FACTS

- 5 | 27. Acting in concert under color of State law to-wit, Revised Code of
- 6 Washington §§ 41.80.010 and 41.80.100 the State of Washington and its
- 7 | numerous departments have recognized the WFSE as the exclusive bargaining
- 8 representative for Plaintiffs and other members of the class. Pursuant to RCW §
- 9 41.80.100, the State of Washington and the WFSE have entered into a collective
- 10 | bargaining agreement which contains a forced unionism clause, Article 40.3.
- 11 | Pursuant to this clause, Plaintiffs and other members of the class are required as a
- 12 condition of employment to either become members of the union and pay
- 13 membership dues, or remain nonmembers and pay an "agency shop" fee equal to
- 14 the amount required to be a member in good standing of the union. According to
- 15 the contract, if an employee does not comply with the forced unionism clause, "the
- 16 Union will notify the Employer and inform the employee that his or her
- 17 employment may be terminated."
- 18 | 28. Pursuant to Article 40.1 "Union Dues," of the CBA, the employer is
- 19 required, upon written authorization of the employee, to remit the compulsory fees
- 20 to the WFSE.
- 21 | 29. On or about May 10, 2005, the WFSE mailed a notice to all employees in
- 22 the represented bargaining units which described the process by which it intended
- 23 to collect this fee from Plaintiffs and all other nonmembers.
- 24 | 30. Included in this notice was (1) a one page introductory section; (2) a one
- 25 page instruction form which described four different ways in which the recipient
- 26 could satisfy the forced unionism obligations; (3) a one page bulleted outline of the
- 27 four different types of fees that an employee could pay under the forced unionism
- 28 clause; (4) a one page form entitled "Representation Fee Request"; (5) a payroll

- 1 deduction authorization; and (6) a document entitled, "Notice to All Employees in
- 2 | Bargaining Units Covered by a Contract Between the WFSE, Council 28 as
- 3 | Certified Bargaining Representative and Their Employer Which Contains Union
- 4 | Security."

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 5 \parallel 31. This notice, particularly the document mentioned in \P 30(6) above, failed to
- 6 provide constitutionally-adequate safeguards of Plaintiffs' and class members'
- 7 | rights which are required by the Supreme Court's decision in *Hudson*, including,
- 8 | but not limited to, the following:
 - a. WFSE has not provided Plaintiffs and class members with an independently verified audit of its financial records nor audited financial disclosure of its affiliates that receive a portion of Plaintiffs' agency fee;
 - WFSE has not provided Plaintiffs and class members with an adequate explanation for the basis of the portions of Plaintiffs' fees which go to WFSE affiliated locals;
 - c. WFSE unlawfully required that nonmember employees who wished to object to funding ideological and other non-bargaining activities sign an automatic payroll deduction form;
 - d. WSFE unlawfully required nonmember fee payers who wished to challenge the union's calculation of the fee to state their "reason for the challenge," and also required challengers to participate in the hearing before an arbitrator.
 - 32. According to Article 49 of the CBA, the agreement itself went into effect on July 1, 2005. The agreement covers the employees of at least 33 different bargaining units throughout the State until June 30, 2007. On or about July 15, 2005, and continuing thereafter, Defendant Murphy began processing representation fee deductions from Plaintiffs Opsal, Flugel (deductions began on or about August 25, 2005), Szpek (deductions began on or about February 10, 2006),

- 1 | and other class members who were required as a condition of employment to
- 2 | authorize such deductions, and remitting said fees to the WFSE, even though
- 3 proper notice regarding the collection of these fees has not been provided.
- 4 (Plaintiffs Koepp, Johnson, Mollenhour, Rice, Sergi, Dunkelman, Woodward, and
- 5 other class members have not authorized such deductions and therefore have not
- 6 paid any fees at this time.) At the time the deductions started, the WFSE had not,
- 7 and still has not, provided Plaintiffs and class members with the procedural
- 8 safeguards described in ¶ 31 above.
- 9 | 33. Even though WFSE failed to provide nonmembers with sufficient
- 10 | information to enable them to determine intelligently whether or not to object to
- 11 and/or challenge the calculation of the amount of the agency fee, Plaintiffs Opsal
- 12 and Flugel and other class members filled out the appropriate WFSE forms in the
- 13 | Summer of 2005 in response to WFSE's May notice, which affirmed their desires
- 14 to object as is their right under the Constitution as interpreted by the United
- 15 States Supreme Court in *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education*, 431 U.S. 209
- **16** (1977), and *Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292 to the WFSE's use of their fees to fund
- 17 | ideological and other non-bargaining activities.
- 18 34. Plaintiff Szpek and, on information and belief, other class members,
- 19 "agreed" to pay to WFSE an "agency fee", which includes *no* reduction for the
- 20 amount that WFSE spends on ideological and other non-bargaining activities,
- 21 under threat of termination of his position at the Department of Labor and
- 22 Industries. Though Plaintiff Spzek, requested to pay the "representation fee"
- 23 amount, which excludes costs that are not related to collective bargaining, he was
- 24 informed by WFSE officials that it was too late for him to make this request, and
- 25 that he would either have to become a union member, remain a nonmember and
- **26** pay the full amount, or be terminated.
- 27 | 35. Because the notices provided by WFSE did not include the information
- 28 specified in ¶ 31, nonmembers were not able to determine intelligently whether or

- 1 | not to challenge WFSE's calculation of the amount of the representation fee.
- 2 | 36. On information and belief, Defendant Murphy has remitted, and continues to
- 3 | remit, to WFSE the fees deducted from the wages of Plaintiffs Opsal, Flugel,
- 4 | Szpek and other class members.
- 5 | 37. On information and belief, sometime in November, 2005, the WFSE sent the
- 6 names of State employees who were not in compliance with the collective
- 7 | bargaining agreement to the Labor Relations Office. The Labor Relations Office
- 8 then notified the individual employing agencies to initiate termination proceedings
- **9** against these employees.
- 10 | 38. On information and belief, WFSE also notified the employer of Plaintiff
- 11 | Woodward the Washington State Department of Licensing that Plaintiff
- 12 | Woodward was not in compliance with the CBA, and requested the employer to
- 13 begin termination proceedings against said Plaintiff. The WFSE made these
- 14 requests notwithstanding the fact that it has never complied with the procedural
- 15 requirements of *Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292.
- 16 | 39. As a result, the Washington State Department of Licensing sent a letter dated
- 17 November 17, 2005, signed by Employer Defendant Alan Haight, to Plaintiff
- 18 Woodward, which threatened her with termination if she did not comply with the
- 19 compulsory unionism clause. The Washington State Department of Licensing
- 20 made this threat notwithstanding the fact that the procedural requirements of
- 21 | Hudson were not met.
- 22 | 40. Plaintiff Woodward responded to the November 17, 2005 letter in a letter
- 23 dated November 25, 2005. In the letter, Plaintiff Woodward expressed her
- 24 frustration with the procedures WFSE had taken in order to collect compulsory
- 25 | fees from her and other nonmembers. She asked that future any correspondence be
- 26 made in writing.
- 27 | 41. By letter dated December 9, 2005, Employer Defendant Alan Haight
- 28 informed Plaintiff Woodward that she was terminated from her position with the

- 1 Department of Licensing effective immediately. This "adverse action" which
- 2 resulted in the termination of Plaintiff Woodward, was carried out notwithstanding
- 3 the fact that the procedural requirements of *Hudson* were not met.
- 4 | 42. On information and belief, WFSE also notified the employer of Plaintiff
- 5 | Dunkelman the Washington State Department of Health that Plaintiff
- 6 Dunkelman was not in compliance with the CBA, and requested the employer to
- 7 | begin termination proceedings against said Plaintiff. The WFSE made these
- 8 | requests notwithstanding the fact that it has never complied with the procedural
- 9 requirements of *Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292.
- 10 | 43. As a result, the Washington State Department of Health sent a letter dated
- 11 December 6, 2005, signed by Employer Defendant Janice Adair, to Plaintiff
- 12 Dunkelman, which threatened her with termination if she did not comply with the
- 13 compulsory unionism clause. This "adverse action" resulted in a subsequent "pre-
- 14 disciplinary" hearing in which this threat was re-emphasized. The Washington
- 15 State Department of Health made this threat notwithstanding the fact that the
- **16** procedural requirements of *Hudson* were not met.
- 17 | 44. By letter dated December 19, 2005, Employer Defendant Janice Adair
- 18 informed Plaintiff Dunkelman that she was terminated effective January 3, 2006.
- 19 This "adverse action" which resulted in the termination of Plaintiff Dunkelman,
- 20 was carried out notwithstanding the fact that the procedural requirements of
- 21 | Hudson were not met.
- 22 | 45. On information and belief, WFSE also notified the employer of Plaintiffs
- 23 Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi, Spzek and other class members the Washington
- 24 State Department of Labor and Industries that said Plaintiffs and other class
- 25 members were not in compliance with the CBA, and requested the employer to
- 26 begin termination proceedings against said Plaintiffs and other class members. The
- 27 WFSE made these requests notwithstanding the fact that it has never complied with
- 28 the procedural requirements of *Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292.

- 1 | 46. As a result, the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries sent
- 2 | letters sometime in November 2005, signed by Employer Defendant Dave Stewart,
- 3 | with courtesy copies sent to Employer Defendant Gary Weeks, to Plaintiffs
- 4 | Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and Spzek, and other class members, which threatened
- 5 | them with termination if they did not comply with the compulsory unionism
- 6 clause. This "adverse action" resulted in subsequent "pre-disciplinary" hearings in
- 7 | which this threat was re-emphasized. The Washington State Department of Labor
- 8 and Industries made these threats notwithstanding the fact that the procedural
- **9** requirements of *Hudson* were not met.
- 10 | 47. In late 2005 and early 2006, Plaintiffs Sergi and Mollenhour filed requests
- 11 for "non-association" and in January, 2006, Plaintiff Szpek signed a payroll
- 12 deduction form. As a result, WFSE has since sent requests to the Washington State
- 13 Department of Labor and Industries rescinding its demand to initiate termination
- 14 proceedings against these three Plaintiffs. On information and belief, the
- 15 Department has not formally rescinded its threats of termination of Plaintiffs
- 16 Mollenhour, Sergi, and Szpek, and there has been no guarantee of protection
- 17 against any future adverse employment action being taken.
- 18 | 48. Plaintiff Johnson has not been able to come to an agreement with Defendant
- 19 WFSE, and is consequently still in imminent danger of having her employment
- 20 terminated.
- 21 | 49. On information and belief, WFSE notified the employer of Plaintiff Koepp
- 22 and other class members the Washington State Department of Social and Health
- 23 | Services that she and other class members were not in compliance with the
- 24 collective bargaining agreement, and requested the employer to begin termination
- 25 proceedings against said Plaintiff and class members. The WFSE made this
- 26 request notwithstanding the fact that it has never complied with the procedural
- 27 | requirements of *Hudson*.
- 28 | 50. As a result, in the beginning of December, 2005, the Washington State

- 1 Department of Social and Health Services sent letters to Plaintiff Koepp and other
- 2 | class members which threatened them with termination if they did not comply with
- 3 | the compulsory unionism clause. This "adverse action" resulted in a subsequent
- 4 "'pre-disciplinary" hearing in which this threat was re-emphasized. The
- 5 | Washington State Department of Social and Health Services made these threats
- 6 notwithstanding the fact that the procedural requirements of *Hudson* were not met.
- 7 | 51. Plaintiff Koepp filed a request for "non-association" with WFSE, which has
- 8 since sent a request to the Washington State Department of Social and Health
- 9 | Services rescinding its demand to initiate termination proceedings against said
- 10 | Plaintiffs. The Department has now rescinded its threat of termination.
- 11 | 52. Plaintiff Rice and other class members have filed timely requests for "non-
- 12 | association" based on bona fide religious tenets after receiving notice of this option
- 13 from WFSE, despite the fact that WFSE has never provided Plaintiffs or class
- 14 members with the procedural safeguards that are constitutionally required under
- 15 | Hudson. Because the WFSE has not granted this request for "non-association,"
- 16 Plaintiff Rice and other class members who filed similar requests, are in imminent
- 17 danger of having their employment terminated.
- 18 | 53. On information and belief, the WFSE has also notified, and will continue to
- 19 notify, the State employers of other class members of their noncompliance with the
- 20 CBA, and other Washington State employees have been terminated, or threatened
- 21 with termination, or will be threatened or actually terminated, for failure to comply
- 22 with the forced unionism clause in the collective bargaining agreement. These
- 23 adverse employment actions have all occurred despite the fact that the WFSE has
- 24 never complied with the procedural requirements of *Hudson*.
- 25 | 54. On information and belief, the Washington State Labor Relations Office will
- 26 continue to direct other Washington State departments to threaten or actually
- 27 terminate other State employees who have not complied with the compulsory
- 28 unionism clause.

1	55. On information and belief, WFSE has not attempted to correct the					
2	deficiencies of the May notice, and unless enjoined by this Court, Defendant					
3	Murphy will continue deducting representation fees from the wages of the					
4	Plaintiffs and class members – except those Plaintiffs who have not authorized					
5	such deductions as described in ¶ 32 - and will remit those deductions to WFSE					
6	without correcting the deficiencies in the May notice. Furthermore, unless					
7	enjoined by this Court, the WFSE and the Employer Defendants will continue to					
8	threaten, or actually terminate, nonmembers who have not complied with the CBA.					
9						
10	CLAIM FOR RELIEF					
11	(Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and					
12	the Constitution of the United States)					
13						
14	56. Plaintiff and class members reassert the foregoing and further allege:					
15	57. These acts and omissions, on the part of Defendant WFSE and the Employer					
16	Defendants, have resulted in the unlawful threats of termination, actual					
17	terminations, and/or seizure of fees which violate the First and Fourteenth					
18	Amendments to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States					
19	Supreme Court in <i>Hudson</i> , 475 U.S. 292, and its progeny. This seizure began on					
20	or about July 15, 2005 and subsequent seizures have occurred and will continue to					
21	occur in the future. The more specific threats of termination began around					
22	November, 2005, and the actual terminations began to occur around December,					
23	2005, and will continue to occur in the future.					
24	58. Plaintiffs' and class members' decisions not to join and pay dues to WFSE					
25	and its affiliates are exercises of their rights to freedom of speech, association,					
26	petition, belief, and thought guaranteed against state action by the First and					
27	Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The actions of WFSE					
28	and Murphy acting in concert to remit and accept from Plaintiffs and class					

members agency fees to WFSE and its affiliates, even for their costs of exclusive representation on behalf of Plaintiffs' and class members' bargaining units, infringe upon those fundamental rights. Similarly, the actions of WFSE, Employer Defendants, and other State departments, acting in concert to threaten Plaintiffs and other class members with termination or actually terminating them for failure to comply with the compulsory unionism clause violate those fundamental rights.

The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

59. The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that the procedures for the collection of compelled agency fees be carefully tailored to limit the infringement on the fundamental rights of nonunion employees to serve the compelling state interest that justifies such fees in the manner least restrictive of the nonunion employees' freedoms of speech, association, petition, belief, thought, and due process, and to facilitate the nonunion employees' ability to protect those rights.

60. These procedural safeguards include:

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- a. notice to nonmembers, before agency fees are collected, that adequately explains the basis for the amount of the fee, including an allocation of major categories of expenses between lawfully chargeable and nonchargeable activities, verified by an independent auditor;
- b. a reduction in the amount of the agency fee for objectors based on the audited financial disclosure, instead of a rebate; and
- a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker without burdensome challenge requirements.
- 61. Plaintiffs claim their constitutional rights, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Hudson*, on behalf of themselves and the class that they seek to represent, to be provided with *all* of the precollection safeguards and procedures that will facilitate their ability to protect these constitutional rights and ensure that none of

their wages are either collected or spent for improper purposes.

- 62. The Defendants' requests for termination, threats of termination, actual terminations, and the seizure of representation fees from the wages of Plaintiff and class members violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the May notice provided by WFSE:
 - a. did not provide an independently verified audit of its financial records nor audited financial disclosure of its affiliates that receive a portion of Plaintiffs' agency fee;
 - b. did not provide an adequate explanation for the basis of the portions of Plaintiffs' fees which go to WFSE affiliated locals; and
 - c. unlawfully required that nonmember employees who wished to object to funding ideological activity sign an automatic payroll deduction form;
 - d. unlawfully required nonmember fee payers who wished to challenge the union's calculation of the fee to state their "reason for the challenge," and also required challengers to participate in the hearing before an arbitrator.
- 63. Defendant WFSE and the other employer Defendants have deprived, and threaten to continue to deprive, Plaintiffs and class members of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as enunciated and specified in *Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292, to be provided the appropriate safeguards and procedural protections prior to, and during, enforcement of the compulsory unionism clause, including requests of termination, threats of termination and actual terminations, as well as the collection of any representation fees by the Rule 19(a) Defendant Murphy.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

64. Unless immediately restrained by this Court, WFSE's and Rule 19(a)

Defendant Murphy's acceptance and remittance of fees from the named Plaintiffs' and class members' wages has directly caused, and will continue to cause,
Plaintiffs and the class members they represent to suffer the irreparable injury that is inherent in the violation of First Amendment rights and for which there is no adequate remedy at law and has deprived and will continue to deprive them of portions of their wages without due process of law.

Unless immediately restrained by this Court, WFSE and Employer Defendants may continue to request, threaten and actually terminate Plaintiffs
Rice Johnson Mollenbour Sergi and other members of the class despite the fact.

Rice, Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi and other members of the class, despite the fact that WFSE has not complied with the procedural safeguards set forth in *Hudson*. Similarly, other Employer Defendants and other State departments may threaten or actually terminate other nonmember employees who have not paid fees under the compulsory unionism clause.

- 66. Wherefore, the Plaintiffs pray that the Court provide relief in the following manner:
 - a. Enter an order, as soon as practical, certifying this case as a class action consisting of the class of all former, current, and future State of Washington employees who are, have been, or will be represented exclusively for purposes of collective bargaining by WFSE, but who are not, or will not be members of WFSE, and were, are, and/or will nevertheless be required to pay nonmember "agency shop" fees to WFSE as a mandatory condition of employment.
 - b. Issue a temporary, preliminary, and permanent order enjoining the WFSE and Rule 19(a) Defendant Murphy, and their agents and employees, from collecting agency fees from the Plaintiffs and other nonmembers unless and until WFSE amends its collection procedures so that they are constitutionally adequate under *Hudson*.
 - c. Issue a temporary, preliminary, and permanent order enjoining the

WFSE and the Employer Defendants, including their agents and employees, from requesting or threatening enforcement of, or actually enforcing, the termination provision of the forced unionism clause in the collective bargaining agreement against Plaintiffs and class members who have not authorized the deduction of fees from their pay unless and until WFSE amends its collection procedures so that they are constitutionally adequate under *Hudson*.

- d. Order that Employer Defendants McLain, Luce, Haight, Selecky and Adair reinstate Plaintiffs Woodward and Dunkelman to their previous positions with their respective former Washington State employers, along with back pay, full benefits, and any attendant damages which directly resulted from the violations of their constitutional rights.
- e. Order that Employer Defendant McLain, in his role as Director of the Washington State Labor Relations Office as well as Employer Defendants Weeks, Arnold-Williams, Luce and Selecky order the reinstatement of other unlawfully terminated class members to their previous positions with their former Washington State employers, along with back pay, full benefits, and any attendant damages which directly resulted from the violations of their constitutional rights.
- f. Issue a declaratory judgment that:
 - i. Employer Defendants McLain, Luce, Haight, Selecky and Adair have taken "adverse action" against Plaintiffs Woodward, Dunkelman and other nonmembers by terminating them for failure to comply with the collective bargaining agreement despite the fact that said Plaintiffs were not provided with their procedural rights as required by *Hudson*, and as such, have violated §1983 as well as the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and other nonmembers.

- ii. Defendant WFSE has violated §1983 and the Plaintiffs' and other nonmembers' constitutional rights as interpreted by *Hudson* and its progeny, by enforcing the compulsory unionism provision, and because fees were unlawfully seized without providing to Plaintiffs and other nonmembers (i) any independently audited financial disclosure, and (ii) an adequate explanation for the basis of the portions of Plaintiffs' and other nonmembers' fees which go to WFSE affiliated locals.
- iii. Employer Defendants have taken "adverse action" against Plaintiffs Koepp, Johnson, Mollenhour, Sergi, Szpek and other class members, by threatening them with termination for failure to comply with the collective bargaining agreement despite the fact that said Plaintiffs and other nonmembers were not provided with their procedural rights as required by *Hudson*, and as such, have violated §1983 as well as the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and other nonmembers.
- iv. Defendant WFSE has violated §1983 and the Plaintiffs' and other nonmembers' constitutional rights by requiring that nonmember employees who wished to object to funding ideological and other non-bargaining activities sign an automatic payroll deduction form.
- v. Defendant WFSE has violated §1983 and the Plaintiffs and other nonmembers' constitutional rights by requiring that nonmember employees who wished to challenge the union's calculation of the compulsory fee to state their "reason for the challenge," and by requiring challengers to participate in the hearing before an arbitrator.
- vi. The United States Constitution prohibits the WFSE and the

1		Employer Defendants from enforcing the forced unionism
2		clause by collecting fees from Plaintiffs and other nonmembers,
3		requesting or threatening employees with termination, and
4		actually terminating employees, without establishing the proper
5		procedural safeguards set forth in Hudson and its progeny.
6	g.	Issue an order requiring Defendant WFSE to pay nominal damages for
7		each Constitutional violation which occurred by each seizure of fees,
8		each request for termination and each threat of termination, where the
9		procedural safeguards established in <i>Hudson</i> were not followed;
10	h.	Award reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and
11	i.	Order any further legal or equitable relief as the Court deems just and
12		proper.
13		
14		
15	Dated this	15 th Day of March, 2006.
16		
17		
18		Respectfully submitted,
19		
20		Stephen Matthews
21		WA State Bar Number: Attorney for the Plaintiffs
22		Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon, PLLC
23		900 Paulsen Center W. 421 Riverside
24		Spokane, Washington 99201 P: (509) 838-6055 F: (509) 625-1909
25		F: (509) 625-1909 sm@spokelaw.com
26		•
27		James Plunkett IL State Bar Number 6283764
28		Attorney for the Plaintiffs c/o National Right to Work Legal

Defense Foundation, Inc. 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600 Springfield, Virginia 22160 P: (800) 336-3600 F: (703) 321-9319 jjp@nrtw.org (Pro Hac Vice Motion pending)